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The G20 and Global Economic Governance
during a Protracted Recession1
Evren ÇELİK WILTSE*

Abstract
Thus far, the G20 represents the most
significant collective attempt to address the
2008 economic crisis by the world’s largest
economies. It is the only global platform that
could serve as an institutional panacea for
the protracted economic slowdown that has
been experienced since 2008. This article
analyses the G20 by situating it in the general
historical-institutional context of the global
economic governance. It compares and contrasts
the G20 with the Bretton Woods institutions.
Subsequently, some of the most pronounced
criticisms of G20 are addressed, including
concerns about possible “agenda creep” and the
lack of a hegemonic underwriter.

Key Words
G20, economic crisis, global governance,
Bretton Woods, emerging economies, BRICs,
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Eurocrisis.

Introduction
Despite some harsh criticism, the G20
remains a relevant platform for global
economic governance. The emerging
* PhD, Assistant Professor of Political Science,
South Dakota State University.
PERCEPTIONS, Winter 2013, Volume XVIII, Number 4, pp. 7-28.

economies particularly benefit from the
rotating annual summits and from the
less hegemonic distribution of power.
Moreover, the G20 generates certain
tangible spill-over effects, particularly
as it is also a venue for collaboration in
diplomatic and non-economic matters.
The progressively increasing involvement
of global civil society in G20 summits, as
well as the US-Russian rapprochement
on Syria at the 2013 Russia Summit,
demonstrates this capacity. Whether
the G20 will be a short-term crisis
management organisation or a longterm international governance structure
that steers the world economy is still up
to the members.
Much ink has been spilled over how
the 2008 crisis left the global economy
in the lurch. Today, the G20 seems to
be one of the rare collective attempts
to pull the global economy out of
its protracted recession. Despite its
sophisticated institutional structure, the
EU displays a colossal dysfunction in
terms of finding a feasible solution to
the eurozone crisis and its “weakest link”
7
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problem, other than possibly purging the
underperformers.2 Across the Atlantic,
the US Congress could not even pass the
2014 budget, and the economy came to
a grinding halt due partisan polarisation.
Given the inability of largest global
economic actors to act as trailblazers
out of the crisis-cum-recession, the
G20 remains a critical venue as the
only global platform to serve as an
institutional panacea for the protracted
crisis. This article is an attempt to
analyse the G20 by situating it in the
general historical-institutional context
of the global economic governance.
Albeit in a primitive form, the G20
resembles post-Second World War
efforts to institutionalise the global
economy under the rubric of Bretton
Woods system. Important differences
remain, however. Most evident is the
lack of a natural hegemon that can pave
the way and overcome collective action
problems.3
The second point emphasised in this
article is the particular role played by the
2008 economic crisis in the evolution
of the G20. Without a doubt the 2008
crisis was a catalyst for the emergence of
a new economic platform that brought
together world’s top 20 economies.
Numerous analysts and policymakers
have highlighted the fact that the scale
and scope of the 2008 crisis compelled
8

the leading economic actors (the G8) to
expand their exclusive club. Emerging
economies were offered a seat at the
commanding heights of global economy,
for they proved to be more resilient than
the members of the G8 in the face of this
protracted recession.

Given the inability of largest
global economic actors to
act as trailblazers out of the
crisis-cum-recession, the G20
remains a critical venue as the
only global platform to serve as
an institutional panacea for the
protracted crisis.
Thirdly, this article tackles the power
dynamics within the G20. Given the
diverse size and nature of the economies
that constitute the G20, the organisation
embodies significant opportunities as
well as drawbacks. Compared to the
exclusive league of the G8, which only
included the advanced North American
and European economies as well as
Japan, the G20 certainly has more
representative and democratic leverage.
However, this greater representation also
means addressing a much more diverse
set of socio-economic and political
concerns. Naturally, an expansion of
membership increases the number of
items on the agenda, making it harder to
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synchronise the priorities of all members
and reach an accord.
In the last section, this article concludes
with an optimistic note regarding the
future of the G20. Upon weighing the
pros and cons in the G20 debate, it states
that the G20 has the potential to become
a viable platform for global economic
collaboration. Currently, the G20 is
the most high-profile organisation
that brings together both advanced
industrialised and developing countries
on equal footing, in an effort to tackle
the pending issues of global economy.
Moreover, the issues are not confined to
economic housekeeping. G20 Summits
might have serious spill-over effects in
international collaboration, as seen with
the inception of “Business 20”, “Think
20” and “Youth 20” summits. At the 2013
Moscow Summit, diplomatic overtures
between Russia and the US on Syria
might have very well averted another
premature US intervention in the Middle
East. This and many other incidents of
diplomatic rapprochement at the annual
summits illustrate the value of the G20
as an emerging platform of multifaceted
global governance. However, it would be
prudent to maintain our caution. In the
absence of a clear protagonist, the G20
can only achieve the goals to which its
members collectively aspire.
If the Doha Round was working
marvellously, and if all these institutions

were working well, there would’ve been
no need for the G-20. The reason that
there is a need for the G-20 is that the
leading economies of the world are no
longer compatible, either culturally,
historically, or economically. They are
very different, and what they have to
do is work this out. And that’s why the
G-20 is absolutely necessary, because
I believe they are in the process of
working it out.4
Paul Martin, Canadian Prime Minister

Why the G20?
A global economy based on free trade
among nations has always required some
form of steering in order to function
smoothly. This was perhaps most acutely
felt after the Great Depression of 1929.
Subsequently, countries in North
America and Western Europe got together
in an effort to mitigate potentially the
self-destructive tendencies of markets.
Following the Second World War,
they developed a new set of rules and
institutions to regulate mutual economic
interactions. As one American official
at the time simply put it, prosperous
neighbours were the best neighbours.
Hence, American policy makers, “liberal
visionaries and hard-nosed geopolitical
strategists” alike, agreed upon building
institutions to realise this goal. They
established a new trade regime that
“embedded” an open international trade
regime that the US advocated, as well
as supported the European style welfare
9
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states.5 Named after the idyllic town in
New Hampshire where the meetings
took place, this new economic regime
came to be known as the Bretton Woods
system.

10

The accumulated wisdom
and experience of more than
half a century illustrates the
fact that, far from being the
bastion of the “invisible hand”,
an international system of free
trade requires certain norms,
rules and formal institutional
structures in order to function
efficiently.

Europe and obliterated Japan. As such,
it was able to craft a system according to
its own image, which meant capitalist
economy and liberal democracy.6 The
liberal institutionalists, on the other hand,
counter the hegemony argument and
emphasise the convergence of mutual
interests and rational collaboration
among the key actors. From their
perspective, by creating the Bretton
Woods institutions, such as the IMF and
the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (IBRD, later the
World Bank), the US was not solely
trying to perpetuate its hegemony, but
was laying the institutional groundwork
for interdependence.7

Two important schools in international
political
economy
(IPE)
have
competing explanations for the postwar international economic order that
emerged under the explicit leadership of
the US at Bretton Woods. One the one
hand, there is the realist school and its
several incarnations. For them, politics
and power dynamics are the dominant
variable, which grants secondary role
to economics in their analysis. As their
name implies, the hegemonic stability
theorists emphasise the role of the US as
the underwriter of the new economic
order. The US came out powerful and
virtually unscathed from a war that
destroyed most of the Great Powers of

Either way, the Bretton Woods regime
established a distinct set of rules and
institutions, and served the interests
of its members rather well. Compared
to the rest of the world, the citizens of
Western Europe, Japan, US and Canada
enjoyed the highest levels of peace and
prosperity for decades to come. Alas,
the Bretton Woods system did not last
forever. Eventually, it gave way to new
institutional arrangements among the
free market economies. These ranged
from GATT (General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade) to the WTO (World
Trade Organisation). The accumulated
wisdom and experience of more than
half a century illustrates the fact that, far
from being the bastion of the “invisible
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hand”, an international system of free
trade requires certain norms, rules and
formal institutional structures in order
to function efficiently.8

report by the prominent UN Economic

Periods of severe economic crisis test
the capabilities of existing institutional
frameworks. Starting with the 1997-98
economic crises, the top eight economies
in the world (Canada, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, Russia, the UK and the
US- the Group of 8 or G8) recognised
the need to include the voices of the
developing world in order to address
the problems of a global economy in a
more comprehensive manner. However,
the 2008 economic crisis proved to be
more critical in terms of exposing the
shortcomings of the G8 framework. The
severity and duration of the 2008 crisis
compelled the established rulers of the
game (i.e. the US, Western Europe and
Japan) to broaden their exclusive circle.
In a sense, they accepted a dilution
of their powers in an effort to save the
system as a whole. Furthermore, there
was also a significant change in the
participant profile. Starting with the
2008 summit, finance ministers and
central bank managers who were the
original participants in G8 summits were
accompanied by their heads of state/
government. The participation of heads
of government inevitably increased the
profile of the G20 summits.9 A recent

way:

Commission on Latin America and the
Caribbean (ECLAC) aptly summarises
the birth of the G20 in the following
This [2008] crisis has also led to the
Group of Twenty (G20), which includes
the main emerging countries, displacing
the traditional Group of Eight (G8) as
the foremost international forum of
economic decision-making. The G20 is
expected to foster greater coordination
as regards fiscal stimuli, financial
stabilization and the reform of the
international financial system.10

Now in its fifth year, the 2008 crisis
has revealed both the growing power
and significance of developing countries
for the world economy. According to
ECLAC, between 2000 and 2008, these
countries accounted for approximately
two-thirds of the growth in world
output, “increasing their share from
37 to 45%”.11 Stronger economic
performance brought greater demand
for global economic governance. The
BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India
and China) in particular became greater
advocates of more representative and fair
international institutional frameworks.
Table 1 below illustrates the average
annual

growth

rate

gap

between

developing and advanced economies in
the last decade.
11
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Table 1: Average annual GDP growth rates, BRICS, the US, the UK and Turkey
(2002-2013)
2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Average

Brazil

2.7

1.1

5.7

3.2

4.0

6.1

5.2

-0.3

7.5

2.7

0.9

2.5

3.4

China

9.1

10.0

10.1

11.3

12.7

14.2

9.6

9.2

10.4

9.3

7.7

7.6

10.1

Germany 0.0
India

3.8

-0.4

0.7

0.8

3.9

3.4

0.8

-5.1

3.9

3.4

0.9

0.5

1.1

8.4

7.9

9.3

9.3

9.8

3.9

8.5

10.5

6.3

3.2

3.8

7.1

Russia

4.7

7.3

7.2

6.4

8.2

8.5

5.2

-7.8

4.5

4.3

3.4

1.5

4.4

Turkey

6.2

5.3

9.4

8.4

6.9

4.7

0.7

-4.8

9.2

8.8

2.2

3.8

5.0

UK

2.3

3.9

3.2

3.2

2.8

3.4

-0.8

-5.2

1.7

1.1

0.2

1.4

1.4

US

1.8

2.8

3.8

3.4

2.7

1.8

-0.3

-2.8

2.5

1.8

2.8

1.6

1.8

Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database October 2013 (% change in GDP, constant prices).

It is important to understand both
the emergence and growing significance
of the G20 in this historical context.
The fast-paced evolution of the global
economy, as well as the changes in
relative distribution of power, is straining
the existing structures of economic
governance. The 2008 crisis and its
aftermath triggered an existential crisis
in Europe, and caused record levels of
unemployment and public debt in the
US. However, as Table 2 below illustrates,
the same period looks like a boon for
countries like China, Brazil, India

12

and Russia. Despite the unfavourable
economic climate, BRIC countries are
steadily rising towards the upper echelons
of the global economy. According to IMF
forecasts, while advanced industrialised
countries are expected to grow around
1.4% in 2013, developing counties will
have average growth rates of 5.5%. This
relative resilience in the face of profound
economic crisis certainly augments the
powers of developing countries at the
table. They demand reforms for greater
inclusion in international economic
governance.
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Table 2: Ranking of Top 20 Economies According to Size (2003-2012)
2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

1

US

US

US

US

US

US

US

US

US

US

2

Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

China

China

China

3

Germany

Germany

Germany

Germany

China

China

China

Japan

Japan

Japan

4

UK

UK

UK

China

Germany

Germany

Germany

Germany

Germany

Germany

5

France

France

China

UK

UK

France

France

France

France

France

6

China

China

France

France

France

UK

UK

UK

Brazil

UK

7

Italy

Italy

Italy

Italy

Italy

Italy

Italy

Brazil

UK

Brazil

8

Canada

Spain

Canada

Canada

Canada

Russia

Brazil

Italy

Italy

Russia

9

Spain

Canada

Spain

Spain

Spain

Brazil

Spain

India

Russia

Italy

10

Mexico

Mexico

Brazil

Brazil

Brazil

Spain

Canada

Canada

India

India

11

Korea

Korea

Mexico

Russia

Russia

Canada

India

Russia

Canada

Canada

12

India

India

Korea

Mexico

India

India

Russia

Spain

Australia

Australia

13

Brazil

Brazil

India

Korea

Korea

Mexico

Australia

Australia

Spain

Spain

Australia

Russia

India

Mexico

Australia

Mexico

Mexico

Mexico

Mexico

Australia

Australia

Australia

Korea

Korea

Korea

Korea

14 Netherlands
15

Australia

Netherlands

16

Russia

Russia

17

Swiss

Turkey

Turkey

Turkey

Turkey

Turkey

Turkey

Turkey

Netherlands

Turkey

18

Sweden

Swiss

Swiss

Swiss

Sweden

Poland

Indonesia

Indonesia

Turkey

Netherlands

19

Belgium

Belgium

Belgium

Belgium

Belgium

Swiss

Swiss

Swiss

S.Arabia

S.Arabia

20

Turkey

Sweden

Sweden

Sweden

Swiss

S.Arabia

Belgium

S.Arabia

Swiss

Swiss

Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands Indonesia

Korea
Indonesia

Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database October 2013 (GDP, current US$).

The Formal Structure of the
G20
Even though G20 meetings have been
taking place since 2000, earlier sessions
maintained a technocratic profile, for
they were attended solely by finance
ministers and central bank directors. The
G20 gained a whole new momentum
when leaders’ summits were introduced
after 2008. The first leaders’ summit took
place in Washington, DC, in November

2008. At the April 2009 London
Summit, G20 leaders collaborated to
increase the funds available for the IMF.
They contributed to extra US $500
billion to the IMF’s expanded New
Arrangement to Borrow (NAB). This
was an interesting moment, for some
members of the G20 (such as Brazil,
India and Turkey) had hitherto been net
borrowers from the IMF, whereas they
now became creditors of this mighty
international financial institution. After
13
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London, came the much-publicised
Pittsburgh Summit in September 2009.
Here, US President Obama declared
that the G20 would be the “premier
forum” for international economic
coordination”. He also highlighted the
need for a more balanced representation
in global economic governance
institutions, which culminated in a
reallocation of 5% of voting shares from
over-represented countries to the underrepresented.12
The structure of the G20 consists of a
rotating presidency among the member
nations. The president hosts the summit
each year. However, in order to establish
continuity a three-member “troika”
consisting of the immediate past, present
and future presidents coordinates the
summit. The 2012 summit was hosted
by Mexico, which then passed the banner
to Russia to host the summit in 2013. In
2014, Australia will be hosting the G20
summit. Turkey will be hosting the G20
summit in 2015.
Since its inception, G20 summits
have been expanding in terms of both
number of members and agenda items.
Whereas initial meetings convened
mostly technocrats in top economic
decision-making, recent annual meetings
include business, labour, civil society
and youth leaders. Business 20, Think
20, Civil 20, Labor 20 and Youth 20
14

are all organisations that have spun off
from the original G20 meetings. Critics
of the G20 point to this development
as potentially distracting. They argue
that the agenda of the G20 will become
so open-ended that nothing can be
accomplished. It dilutes the focus and
energy of the organisation. Moreover,
the rotating chairs also try to put their
imprint on the summit by highlighting
an issue that is near and dear to them.
At the Seoul Summit, development was
added to the G20 agenda. In 2012,
Mexico was particularly insistent on
“green growth”. The Russian presidency
in 2013 emphasised “growth with jobs”.
While this “personal touch” is a source
of motivation for the host countries,
at the same time it might create an
inflation of “honourable missions” for
the G20 to tackle. It is possible that the
rotating presidency aspect of the G20 is
partly responsible for the “agenda creep”
concerns.

At Bretton Woods, the
hegemonic position of the US
provided the economic backing,
political will and credible
enforcement mechanisms that
were believed to be necessary to
move forward.
The leader-centric characteristic of
G20 carries certain advantages and
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disadvantages. At times, host countries
and their leaders work hard to put their
mark on the event. They choose to
emphasise an agenda item and promote
the summit in ways that will also
promote their country’s global presence.
This was clearly observed in the Mexican
case in 2012. First, Mexican President
Felipe Calderon moved the summit
to an earlier date- that is, prior to the
Mexican presidential elections in 2012so that he, rather than his successor,
could host this prestigious event (the
Mexican Constitution bans re-election
of presidents). Under Calderon’s
stewardship, Mexico spent significant
effort to augment the institution of
G20 by holding the first ever Foreign
Ministers’ Summit at Los Cabos. This
was perceived as a welcome move as it
facilitated diplomatic cooperation and
collaboration among the G20 members.
Even to those who were rather sceptical
of the G20 summits gave due credit to
President Calderon’s performance: “The
efforts of the Mexican presidency allowed
for limited progress in a number of areas,
thereby sparing the summit from being
characterized as a total failure”.13
However, the leader-centric aspect of
G20 summits can also go remarkably
wrong. France in 2011 is case in point.
At the 2011 Cannes Summit, French
President Nicolas Sarkozy acted as if the
whole event was a stage for his national

re-election campaign. This self-centred
attitude undermined the collective
purpose of the G20 that year, which
was a key meeting in the midst of euro
crisis.14

Is the G20 Another Bretton
Woods in the Making?
While the circumstances leading to
the emergence of the G20 have some
similarities with the Bretton Woods
era, the differences are probably more
pronounced. First, the G20 is not a
usual international organisation (IO). It
does not have a formal charter. It has no
established bureaucracy, no headquarters
or standing committees. Each year, one of
the members hosts the annual meeting.
“Sherpas” from each country act as the
country representatives. As it stands, the
G20 is a loosely structured and leaderfocused arrangement, whereby top
leaders of world’s largest economies meet
annually. The emphasis is on process and
consensus building at the top level.
Secondly, there is the issue of relative
power distribution within the group.
Unlike the Bretton Woods process,
the G20 gives equal position to all its
members. Advanced economies and
emerging economies are on a par with
each other. Moreover, there is no overt
exercise of US hegemony. At Bretton
15
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Woods, the hegemonic position of the
US provided the economic backing,
political will and credible enforcement
mechanisms that were believed to be
necessary to move forward. In the case
of G20 however, the absence of a clear
hierarchical pecking order makes some
analysts rather sceptical. They argue that
such a large and diverse set of actors
cannot align their competing interests
and cooperate on substantive matters.
Morgan, for instance, is particularly
critical of the new members:

In contrast to the G7, which was
composed of states with relatively the
same interests and that were accepting
of the United States’ dominant role,
the G20 includes geopolitical rivals and
states with widely diverging capabilities
and agendas.15

The lack of a hegemonic underwriter for
the G20 project is increasingly perceived
as a weakness by the sceptics. Among
them, the economist Nouriel Roubini,
famous for his accurate projections of
global macroeconomic trends, has stated
that “we are going to G-Zero, with no
global economic governance”.16

Chart 1: The GDP of G20 members, including the EU 27 (2012, in current US$)
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Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2012, at http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/worlddevelopment-indicators/wdi-2012 [last visited 10 November 2013].
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Chart 2: The comparative economic size of G20 members, excluding the EU 27
FR 5%

UK 4% BR 4%

IT 4%
RUS 4%

GER 6%

IN 4%
CAN 3%

TR 1%

AUS 3%
JP 11%

INDO 2%
Other 10%

AR 1%
S.AFR 1%

KOR 2%

CH 15%

SA 1%

MEX 2%

US 28%

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2012, at http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/worlddevelopment-indicators/wdi-2012 [last visited 10 November 2013].

Charts 1 and 2 above illustrate the
relative size of the G20 economies. As seen
in Chart 1, the EU is the largest entity,
as it combines 27 national economies.
However, the EU is far from leading
the pack as the hegemon. The eurozone
crisis has exposed the EU’s shortcomings
as an internally coherent economic actor,
especially when it comes to coordinating
fiscal policy. This leaves the stage open for
the US, who is the natural contender for
hegemony. Yet, many analysts on various
sides of the ideological spectrum concur
that, in the last two decades, the US has
been experiencing a hegemonic decline
for various reasons. Consequently, it
is not in a position to lead the way, or
absorb the costs of collective action

under the G20 framework. The third in
line is China. There has been a cottage
industry of scholarship and punditry on
the phenomenal growth rates of China’s
economy. However, analysts have not
yet reported serious muscle-flexing
by the Chinese single-party rulers in
ways that would hint aspirations of a
hegemonic role in global economy. Low
per capita incomes, massive stockpiles of
labour in rural China and the delicate
balance between a capitalist economy
in a socialist one-party political system
make domestic concerns more urgent for
the Chinese leaders than underwriting
the rules of the game in new global
institutions. This then brings us to the
mid-level economic powers: from Japan
17
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and Germany, to France, the UK and
Brazil. While each is a commendable
actor in their respective region, none has
the capacity to act as the hegemon on a
global scale.

The eurozone crisis has exposed
the EU’s shortcomings as an
internally coherent economic
actor, especially when it comes
to coordinating fiscal policy.
In short, Roubini’s characterisation of
the current global power distribution
as “G-Zero” might be apt in the sense
that no country enjoys indubitable
superiority over the others. This vacuum
of leadership, combined with a set
of developing countries that lack the
economic leverage and/or political will
to shape the new global institutional
structures constitute significant problems
for global economic governance,
according to Roubini.17
However, the leadership void this may
not necessarily be a handicap for the
G20. What is considered a deficiency
from the (neo)realist perspectives might
even be a blessing from a more liberal
standpoint. The lack of a predominant
player may trigger genuine coalition
building across a diverse set of economic
actors. These interactions on several
18

fronts (i.e. business, civil society, youth,
etc.) might help the actors perceive the
global economic game as a “complex
interdependent” exchange18 à la Keohane
and Nye, rather than one of hegemonic
domination
and
subservience.
Consequently, the G-Zero environment
might very well facilitate the formation
of a more democratic and egalitarian
global institutional framework. Lack of
a hegemonic actor might prove to be an
asset for the G20, rather than a liability.
A third important point of deviation
of G20 from the Bretton Woods model
concerns the agenda setting. In the case
of Bretton Woods, the agenda was laid
out clearly from the start, largely by the
US. In contrast, the G20 has not had an
agenda that is set in stone- yet. While
it emerged as an effort to address the
2008 economic crisis, the diversity of its
members, as well as the rotation of host
countries inevitably alter the issues that
show up on the G20 agenda annually.
This situation invites “agenda creep”
criticisms, especially from economic
policy technocrats.
Initially, the focus of G20 was almost
exclusively on economic stability and
fiscal policy. Given this tight definition
of its scope, only finance ministers
and central bank directors attended
the meetings. As the G20 process has
evolved, participation has expanded,
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and now includes top political leaders,
business elites, think-tanks and civil
society activists. These new groups
brought with them new issues to be
addressed by the G20. A medley of
concerns, ranging from green growth to
fossil fuel subsidies, and food security to
corruption, have been included on the
G20’s agenda.
The fact remains that the members of
the G20 are a diverse group with very
different economic concerns. Some
advocate a classic neo-liberal economic
model, while others like China
implement state-led capitalism. The 2008

crisis illustrated that even among the
advanced economies there is significant
variation. While Europe is trying to save
its welfare states, the US is trying to
strengthen it with comprehensive health
care reforms. Moreover, the absence of a
hegemonic agenda setter means that the
priorities of all G20 participants may not
be perfectly aligned at any given point.
When compared to the Bretton Woods
system, the G20 displays a significantly
different institutional structure and
power distribution pattern. The graphic
below illustrates the diverse priorities
of the emerging economies vis-à-vis the
advanced ones.

Graphic 1: The compatibility of issues at the G20
Priorities of rising economies
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Challenges in Front of the
G20:
• Conflicting national interests: At the
2012 summit, members of the G20
agreed to subject their respective
economic performances to the
scrutiny of the group through the
IMF. This step will increase the
viability of any effort to coordinate
the global economy. As such, certain
recommendations emerged from the
2012 Los Cabos Summit. The advice
was wide-ranging but specific. For
example, it was recommended that
China bring down its phenomenally
high savings rates and slow down
its rate of reserve accumulation.
Furthermore, most countries agreed
that China has maintained an
artificially low exchange rate, which
gives an unfair edge to Chinese
exports. Consequently, they advised
China to allow more realistic
exchange rates.
At the same time, Turkey and Brazil
were asked to do something about
their low savings rates. Both countries
have impressive growth rates but this
performance is not sustainable given
the meagre ratio of domestic savings.
Germany appears to be doing rather
well compared to the crisis-riddled
eurozone, but it too was told to
20

liberalise its services. And the list
went on.
However,
without
a
potent
mechanism
to
enforce
such
recommendations, it is not clear
whether members would be obliged
to follow them. Both Germany and
China maintain large trade surpluses,
and perceive this as in their own
national interests. In contrast many
other countries, particularly those
in Southern Europe, have bled
white under the strain of chronic
trade deficits. Kemal Derviş of the
Brookings Institute highlights these
diverging priorities and potential lack
of cohesion among the G20 members
as a point of concern. Unfortunately,
the G20 has not yet developed the
right tool-kit to address this issue of
divergent national interests.19
• Changing
existing
governance
structures: The pillars of today’s
global economic order were created
after the Second World War. Thus,
they reflect the power dynamics
of that era. Echoing the world of
1945, key international financial
institutions, such as the World Bank
and the IMF, give significant powers
and representation to the Western
nations.
In the last decades, many contenders
have challenged the superstructures
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of the old economic order. The centre
of global economic power is rapidly
shifting to the Southern and Eastern
hemispheres, with the rise of the
Asia-Pacific region and the BRICs.
Predictably, these emerging countries
desire the top international economic
institutions to be more representative
and democratic. However, such
demands come at the expense of the
established Western powers.

Rather than trying to tackle
massive financial conglomerates
separately countries would be
better off by combining their
forces and amplifying their
power.
The G20 will be an important venue
for negotiating the re-structuring
of global economic governance.
Emerging economies have already
displayed their commitment to
global governance. They effectively
saved the IMF from obscurity, when
they transferred massive amounts of
funds to the Fund at the peak of the
global recession. Recent assessments
note that emerging markets account
for more than two thirds of global
economic growth. It is only fair that
these nations are expecting a more
equitable distribution of power in

global economic governance, one
that is commensurate with their new
economic might.
• Regulating the financial sector: The
task of global economic coordination
and governance under the G20 entails
financial regulation of more than
20 banking systems. Today, there is
nearly uniform consensus that the
economic crisis of 2008 was due to
the blunders of the financial sector,
which started with the subprime
mortgage markets in the US and
spread like wild fire. Because the
banks were “too big to fail”, the US
and other countries devised massive
rescue packages to save the banks and
their respective national economies.
According to Paul Krugman, banks
today are even larger than they were
during the 2008 crisis. It seems
that financial institutions have an
insatiable appetite to merge and
expand into behemoths. At the same
time, their governors are extremely
savvy about ways to avoid regulation,
public scrutiny and oversight.20 Yet,
problems in the financial sector
severely undermine the performance
of the real sectors of the economy,
creating a credit crunch or overall
macroeconomic instability.
Tackling this issue will be a major
challenge for the G20. Part of the
21
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problem lies in the varying ideological
positions of the G20 leaders. While
some of the centrist and leftist leaders
are eager to reign in the financial
sector, those on the right are not
generally enthusiastic supporters of
financial regulation. For instance,
since London is a major hub of global
finance, the conservative Prime
Minister of the UK is adamant about
blocking any measures that will clamp
down on finance capital. Regarding
financial sector regulations, Turkey
is in the pro-regulation camp, along
with most of the emerging markets.
Financial regulation is more likely
to be resolved in a collective setting
than through action by individual
nations. Rather than trying to tackle
massive financial conglomerates
separately countries would be better
off by combining their forces and
amplifying their power. If the stars
align and a powerful pro-regulation
coalition can emerge within the G20,
it could offer a great opportunity
to address the distortions and
malfunctions of the finance sector.
Meanwhile, we might have to settle
for the ad hoc cases of criminal
charges, such as JP Morgan’s London
Whale scandal in 2012, or its US $13
billion settlement for mortgage fraud
in 2013.21
22

The Future of the G20:
Prospects and Drawbacks
Most analysts of the G20 point
at “agenda creep” as a major source
of concern. As discussed above, the
G20 initiative has gained significant
momentum after the 2008 crisis,
with an overwhelming emphasis on
macroeconomic stability and fiscal policy
coordination. However, as the emerging
economies became more and more
involved, issues of economic growth
and development have also been added
to the agenda. Subsequently, sustainable
energy, phasing-out of fossil fuels, green
growth, food security and climate change
have become part of the G20 agenda.
Critiques argue that the G20 will
soon have “agenda fatigue” due to this
exponentially increasing list of noble
causes. Similar criticisms have also been
raised by the technocratic teams of each
of the G20 members, who tend to prefer
a narrow and tightly defined scope for
the G20. Staffs of finance ministries and
central banks generally claim that a too
diffuse agenda dilutes the effectiveness
of the G20. From their perspective, the
G20 should “stick to its original agenda”,
to have global financial stability and
coordination as its foremost goal.
This “agenda creep” criticism does
carry some merit. Certainly, the G20
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cannot have a completely open-ended
approach to agenda setting, wherein
new items are added at every summit
to an ever-growing to-do list. Yet, this
zero-sum perspective also assumes
that collaboration in different areas,
such as diplomacy or environment,
would come at the expense of financial
sphere. Essentially, the advocates of a
streamlined agenda conceptualise the
G20 exclusively in an economic and
technocratic manner.
Contrary to the arguments of “agenda
creep” critiques, most successful

examples of international collaboration
illustrate that cooperation in one area
tends to provide positive spill-over effects
in other areas. A notable example is the
1950 coal and steel partnership between
France and Germany, which paved the
way for the EU of today. Consequently,
the efforts by foreign ministers, business
and civil society representatives at the
G20 summits should not be perceived
as “distractions” from the main cause.
Rather, they should be utilised to
amplify the economic collaboration
efforts among the member nations.

Table 3: GDP per capita of the G20 members (2012, in US$ purchasing power
parity (ppp) adjusted)
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Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2012, at http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/worlddevelopment-indicators/wdi-2012 [last visited 10 November 2013].
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Another response to accusations of
agenda creep can be found in the diversity
of the G20 members. As Table 3 above
displays, the G20 includes countries
with per capita incomes of more than US
$40,000 (US, Australia and Canada) to
less than US $10,000 (China, Indonesia
and India). The difference between US
and Indonesia is nearly tenfold. By their
very nature, these economies do not have
a singular concern that impacts them
across the board equally. As the platform
expands, so does the agenda. It is no
surprise that at the 2010 Seoul Summit
“development” was added to the agenda,
since it is a pressing concern for nearly
half of the G20 members who have
yet to reach the US $20,000 per capita
income threshold.

The costs of borrowing remain
high for Europe’s debtors, and
Germany seems extremely
reluctant to allow growth with
inflation.
A second issue that is frequently cited
by the analysts is the eurozone crisis. The
ongoing tribulations of the eurozone 17
seem to be hurting the effectiveness of the
G20. Since the institutional structures of
global economic governance are heavily
skewed towards European and North
American economies, their troubles are
24

crippling the international efforts for
stability. As seen in Chart 1, the EU, with
its 28 members, constitutes the largest
economic block in the G20. Almost five
years into the crisis, Europeans seem
unable to find a feasible solution to the
unsustainable gap between its exportoriented, surplus-generating economies
and import-oriented, deficit-generating
economies. The costs of borrowing
remain high for Europe’s debtors, and
Germany seems extremely reluctant to
allow growth with inflation. Instead, the
locomotive of the euro calls for more
austerity, choking the overall economic
system.22
As they muddle through this crisis,
Europe is effectively acting as a damper
on the potential progress of G20. Nobel
laureate Joseph Stiglitz describes a rather
frosty exchange, when he comments on
the lack of solidarity within Europe:
One very senior government official
of a northern European country did
not even put down his fork when
interrupted by an earnest dinner
companion who pointed out that many
Spaniards now eat out of garbage cans.
They should’ve reformed earlier, he
replied, as he continued to eat his steak.

Stiglitz too is among those who
observe a gradual shift towards a G-Zero
world, but he is optimistic about the
performance of the emerging markets.
Globalisation brings interdependence
of risk. As long as the US and Europe
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do not “torpedo developing countries”,
global economic growth might resume,
despite the “failures of the West”.23

While countries like Mexico,
France and most recently Russia
strongly endorse regulation, the
Anglo-American alliance seems
to avoid the discussion at all
costs.
In the early stages of the 2008 crisis,
financial institutions were bailed out by
sovereign funds, with the excuse that they
were too-big-to-fail. Today, they are even
bigger and riskier, as the case of banking
crisis in Cyprus has tragically revealed.
Yet, five years into the crisis, effective
regulation of the financial sector still
remains on the back burner of the G20
agenda. Financial regulation with teeth,
the adoption of some kind of financial
transaction tax and the elimination of
tax havens constitute the soft underbelly
of the G20. While countries like Mexico,
France and most recently Russia strongly
endorse regulation, the Anglo-American
alliance seems to avoid the discussion at
all costs.
Reforms in the financial sector
carry significant repercussions for the
members of the G20. Despite the
massive influx of public funds, it is

unfortunate that the corporate culture
of astronomical bonuses and lack of
transparency or accountability remains
untouched, particularly in the US.
Even when caught red handed, financial
institutions, such as HSBC, are now
“too big to jail”.24 Token penalties do
not seem sufficient deterrents to alter
the culture of impunity in the financial
sector. Even the 2008 crisis could have
been used as an opportunity to address
the abuses in the financial sector. Earlier
in the crisis, small- and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs) were systematically
denied credit by large commercial banks
on the grounds that they were too risky
and not commercially viable. However,
in the developing world, SMEs account
for nearly half of the labour force in
manufacturing. Their access to credit and
financial services is a critical component
for growth and development. The
G20 has multiple members with the
experience of development banks and
community banks. Canada, India, Brazil
and Germany could offer significant
experience in terms of SME-sensitive
and development-friendly banking
practices.25 Since financial sector
reforms are among Russia’s top agenda
items in 2013, one can only hope that
aforementioned countries will rise up
to the plate and come up with concrete
proposals.
25
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Interestingly, the activism of emerging
economies may become especially
significant while Europe is bogged down
in an existential nightmare. At the Los
Cabos Summit in 2012, emerging
economies contributed US $65 billion
to the IMF’s emergency funds. The
goal of this contribution was to buttress
the Fund against an escalation of the
eurozone crisis.26 The seeds of a solution
to eurozone problems might already be
embedded within the G20. A strong and
viable G20 that has an equitable structure
of representation between developed and
emerging economies would have the
wherewithal to pull the eurozone out of
this quandary.

Despite some harsh criticism,
the G20 is still a relevant
platform for global economic
governance, for it annually
brings together top leaders of the
world’s largest 20 economies.
Lastly, the 2013 Moscow Summit may
not be remembered for its economic
success. However, it certainly will
be memorable for the political and
diplomatic breakthrough that it catered
to. At a time when the US President
was leaning strongly towards a military
intervention in Syria due to alleged
chemical weapons use by the Assad
26

regime, the Moscow Summit proved to
be the perfect opportunity to discuss
the issue face to face with the Russian
Premier, who happened to be an ally of
the Syrian regime.27 Subsequent to the
summit, the US pushed the military
option onto the back burner and deferred
the subject to a larger international
audience, particularly including Russia
and China. This is probably one of the
most high profile incidents wherein an
economic collaboration venue lent itself
to collaboration on military/strategic
issues.

Conclusion
It is too early to decide whether G20
actions to date have been a success or
failure. Despite some harsh criticism, the
G20 is still a relevant platform for global
economic governance, for it annually
brings together top leaders of the world’s
largest 20 economies. Moreover, it
yields some tangible results as a venue
for collaboration on non-economic
matters as well. The members of the G20
constitute about two-thirds of the world
population and account for 90% of
global GDP. Whether it will be a shortterm crisis management organisation,
or a long-term international governance
structure that steers the world economy,
is still up to the members.
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